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ABSTRACT
Personal audio logs are often recorded in multiple environments.
This poses challenges for robust front-end processing, including
speech/nonspeech detection (SND). Motivated by this, we investi-
gate the robustness of four different privacy-sensitive features for
SND, namely energy, zero crossing rate, spectral flatness, and kur-
tosis. We study early and late fusion of these features in conjunction
with modeling temporal context. These combinations are evaluated
in mismatched conditions on a dataset of nearly 450 hours. While
both combinations yield improvements over individual features,
generally feature combinations perform better. Comparisons with a
state-of-the-art spectral based and a privacy-sensitive feature set are
also provided.
Index Terms— Privacy Sensitive Features, Speech/nonspeech
detection
1. INTRODUCTION
Recording spontaneous conversations, also referred to as personal
audio logs, to analyze face-to-face human interaction patterns is an
emerging field [1, 2]. However, one of the biggest obstacles fac-
ing this field concerns privacy. For example, recording and storing
raw audio could breach the privacy of people whose consent has not
been explicitly obtained. A possible solution to this problem is to
store task-specific features instead of raw audio, such that neither in-
telligible speech nor lexical content can be reconstructed [2]. These
features are referred to as privacy-sensitive (or privacy-preserving)
features [2].
A key pre-processing step in conversational analysis is to per-
form speech/nonspeech detection (SND). State-of-the-art SND sys-
tems such as [3] utilize short-term spectral envelope based features.
However, with such features both speech and lexical content can
be reconstructed. Previous studies on privacy-sensitive features for
modeling conversations have used short-term autocorrelation and
spectral entropy [4, 5]. Long-term spectral averages have also been
used as features for speech segmentation in personal audio record-
ings [1].
In an earlier paper [6], we investigated the use of four differ-
ent, privacy-sensitive features, obtained by temporal processing of
the audio signal, for speech detection in a multiparty conversation
scenario. These features are the classical features, energy (E), zero
crossing rate (Z), spectral flatness (S), and kurtosis (K). We showed
that modeling the temporal context explicitly yields improvements
for all privacy-sensitive features, including the features from [4, 5].
We also showed that the performance of all the privacy-sensitive
features modeled with context is close to that of state-of-the-art
spectral-based features used in [3]. However, this was done in
matched conditions.
This paper is motivated by the fact that real-life personal audio
logs often contain audio recorded in various environments. Conse-
quently, we propose to evaluate the robustness of these four features
(S,E,Z and K) in mismatched conditions. We also benchmark the
performance of other authors’ privacy-sensitive [4, 5] and a set of
state-of-the-art features [3] in mismatched conditions. An important
handicap for this evaluation is the lack of standard datasets in the per-
sonal audio log domain, due to privacy concerns. To overcome this
challenge, we use the scenario constructed in our earlier study [6].
Our study shows that explicitly modeling the temporal context
is useful for SND in mismatched conditions as well. Furthermore,
we show that combining features (referred to as “early integration”)
or combining classifiers built on the individual features (referred to
as “late integration”) yield improvements. Lastly, combinations of
the four features with context modeling, or of the features described
in [4, 5] can yield, in certain cases, performance comparable to the
state-of-the-art spectral based SND features [3] in mismatched con-
ditions. We emphasize that our goal here is not to design the best
SND system, but to evaluate the robustness of the privacy-sensitive
features in mismatched conditions, in order to assess such a design.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The definition of
the dataset and the annotations is provided in Section 2. Section 3
discusses the SND system in terms of features, classifier, combina-
tion techniques, reference features and the evaluation measure. The
description of the results and the discussion is provided in Sections
4. Finally, we draw some conclusions in Section 5.
2. DEFINITION OF DATA AND ANNOTATIONS
We use the scenario that was constructed in our previous study [6]. In
that study, personal audio logs collected by subjects wearing portable
audio recorders was likened to a meeting room scenario captured
using lapel microphones. It was remarked that the placement of the
recorder is similar to that of a lapel microphone used in recording
meeting room conversations [2]. In the contrast to the traditional
meeting room applications where, given the lapel microphone signal,
the interest generally lies in the speech segments of the wearer [3, 7],
in conversation analysis, speech segments that are spoken by other
speakers are also of interest.
The dataset and annotations were used from our setup [6]. It
consists of “individual” lapel microphone recordings used in con-
junction with the ground truths obtained by merging speech seg-
ments from individual lapel ground truths that are closer than a fixed
time interval (100ms). Our experiments were performed on lapel mi-
crophone recordings from NIST [8], AMI [9], and ICSI [10] meet-
ing room data. To summarize, the total data add up to 100 hours
of meeting speech spanned over 120 meetings. The actual amount
of individual lapel recordings add upto nearly 450 hours with NIST,
AMI and ICSI contributing 52, 50 and 350 hours respectively. The
training data from NIST, AMI and ICSI amounted to 9, 15 and 48
hours respectively. Finally, using the ground truth defined above, the
overall ratio of nonspeech to speech was 1:4.2. To test the perfor-
mance on mismatched conditions, the features were trained in turn
on each of the 3 datasets and tested on the other two.
3. SND SYSTEM
The features are extracted by first pre-emphasizing the signal and
then by using a rectangular analysis window of length and shift 25
ms and 10 ms, respectively. In addition, we augment these basic
features with their first and second derivatives.
3.1. Privacy-sensitive features
The proposed and the reference privacy-sensitive features are briefly
discussed.
3.1.1. Proposed features
We evaluate the robustness of the four features investigated in our
earlier study [6]. These four short-term features are: energy (E),
zero crossing rate (Z), spectral flatness measure (S), and kurtosis
(K) as privacy-sensitive features for SND. To simplify notations, let
us define F (SEZK) as the system with the combination of all four
features at “feature-level” andF (EZK) as the system with the com-
bination of energy, zero-crossing rate and kurtosis at “feature-level”.
3.1.2. Reference privacy-sensitive features (AH)
Features proposed in [5, 4] for privacy-sensitive speech detection
are the non-initial maximum of the normalized autocorrelation, the
number of autocorrelation peaks and the relative spectral entropy.
Let AH denote the system using these features.
3.2. Reference spectral-based features (MF-PLP)
The reference spectral-based features (that is, non privacy-sensitive)
are taken from a state-of-the-art SND system [3]. The features con-
sist of 12 mel-frequency PLP coefficients (computed using HTK)
and first cepstral coefficient c0, with their delta and acceleration co-
efficients, in addition to energy and kurtosis. In [3], these were aug-
mented with a set of cross-channel based features. Since we use each
microphone channel independently, we drop the cross-channel based
features, while we retain all the other features. Let MF −PLP de-
note the system using these features.
3.3. Classifier
In this paper, we used off-the-shelf trained multi-layer perceptron
(MLP) nets for individual (S, E, Z, and K) and the joint features
(F (SEZK) and F (EZK)) from our earlier setup [6]. In that study,
these were the best combination of joint features. The MLP was
trained for speech/nonspeech classes based on the ground truth def-
inition described in Section 2, using two output units, 200 hidden
units and by minimizing the cross-entropy criterion. The reference
features were analyzed with a trained MLP using 31 frame context
(310 ms) as the input layer and 50 units in the hidden layer. The
features are normalized to zero-mean and unit variance at the input
of the MLP. All the features were augmented with delta and acceler-
ation features. Further details can be obtained in [6].
3.4. Classifier combination
One of the objectives of classifier combination ( [11, 12]) is to ex-
ploit the complementary information between the classifiers. Com-
bination techniques typically combine either the decisions made
by the individual classifiers or assign a weight to each classifier’s
evidence. These weights can be either estimated statically (on cross-
validation data) or dynamically. In this paper, we consider two
weight allocation strategies:
• Dynamic weighting using inverse entropy.
• Static weighting using equal weights/averaging.
3.4.1. Inverse entropy
Inverse entropy based classifier combination has been shown to be
useful in automatic speech recognition studies [12]. In the discus-
sion that follows, let c ∈ {s, n} denote the speech/nonspeech classes
and let xkt denote a feature vector at a time t for k ∈ {S,E, Z,K}.
P (c|xkt ; θk) denotes the posterior probability estimate obtained from
the MLP classifier trained on a feature k ∈ {S,E,Z,K}, and θk
denotes the MLP model for a feature k. Inverse entropy based com-
bination assigns larger weights to classifiers that are more confident
and smaller weights to classifiers that are less confident [12]. The
confidence of the kth classifier is measured in terms of the entropy
(hk) of its posterior probabilities. The weights for the kth classifier
are then estimated as:
wk =
1
hkP
j
1
hj
∀k ∈ {S,E,Z,K} (1)
The combined evidence using all the features Xkt :
P (c = i|Xkt ) =
X
k∈{S,E,Z,K}
wk · P (c = i|x
k
t ; θk) ∀i ∈ {s, n}
(2)
3.4.2. Averaging
In this technique [11], all the classifiers are assigned equal weights,
i.e., wk = 1N . The output evidence is combined using equation 2.
As part of notation, we use Cmean(SEZK) and Cent(SEZK) to
denote the systems with combinations of classifiers built on individ-
ual features S, E, Z and K using equal weights and inverse entropy
techniques.
3.5. Evaluation measure
For evaluation, we use the area under the receiver operating char-
acteristics (ROC) curve as a metric to evaluate speech detection,
as in [6, 7] . The ROC curve is plotted by varying the detection-
threshold on the posterior probability estimates provided by the
MLP. A value of 50% for the area under ROC indicates a ran-
dom performance and value of 100% indicates a perfect classifica-
tion. Furthermore, this measure was selected so that the evaluation
measure is not biased towards a prior distribution of speech and
nonspeech.
Table 1. Effect of context on SEZK and EZK using feature combination (in percentage of area under ROC). N, A, and I refer to NIST, AMI,
and ICSI datasets. A → B refers to the system being trained on a dataset A and being tested on a dataset B. AH(x) refers to the reference
privacy-sensitive features with a temporal context of x ms.
N A I N→A N→I A→N A→I I→N I→A
Context (ms) Matched conditions Mismatched conditions
SEZK
10 77.6 80.7 73.1 77.0 67.1 76.3 74.1 70.1 76.9
250 84.0 89.6 80.9 83.8 71.7 85.5 78.5 83.1 87.0
510 84.0 91.5 81.5 79.7 71.5 86.7 80.6 83.6 87.2
1010 83.8 91.1 80.6 82.7 72.9 86.3 79.4 82.7 86.2
EZK
10 77.8 80.1 73.8 78.5 72.0 75.6 74.0 72.9 78.2
250 83.5 88.8 80.5 82.3 74.4 84.1 78.7 81.3 85.8
510 84.1 90.8 81.8 82.0 75.5 86.0 80.3 82.5 86.7
1010 83.5 90.6 81.3 80.9 73.8 86.5 79.7 81.7 85.6
Reference features
Features N A I N→A N→I A→N A→I I→N I→A
Matched conditions Mismatched conditions
AH(10) 74.9 79.8 72.7 77.4 68.7 75.4 68.1 72.9 75.0
AH(510) 83.3 90.3 85.7 86.0 75.7 85.3 78.9 83.6 88.1
MF-PLP 83.0 91.3 90.3 84.9 73.5 86.5 84.8 84.3 88.4
Table 2. Effect of context on SEZK using classifier combinations (in percentage of area under ROC). N, A, and I refer to NIST, AMI, and ICSI
datasets. A→ B refers to the system being trained on a dataset A and being tested on a dataset B.
N A I N→A N→I A→N A→I I→N I→A
Context (ms) Matched conditions Mismatched conditions
Averaging the posteriors
10 77.7 79.1 71.6 76.4 68.5 78.1 71.5 76.6 78.5
250 84.8 87.6 78.1 83.8 74.3 85.2 75.6 83.0 84.7
510 85.7 89.2 80.1 84.6 75.0 86.4 76.4 83.8 85.7
1010 85.9 90.1 80.4 85.0 75.6 86.9 77.7 83.5 84.4
Weighting the posteriors using inverse entropy
10 74.9 78.5 71.9 76.7 68.7 74.7 70.4 73.5 78.3
250 82.7 87.5 78.4 83.8 74.4 82.7 75.7 80.9 84.4
510 83.5 89.3 80.1 84.6 75.1 83.8 76.9 82.1 85.4
1010 83.8 90.1 79.8 85.0 75.6 84.0 78.1 81.8 84.7
4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
The results for the privacy-sensitive features and the spectral-based
feature in mismatched conditions are reported in Tables 1, 2, and 3
for NIST, AMI, and ICSI meeting data. In the discussion that fol-
lows, N, A, and I refer to NIST, AMI and ICSI datasets. A → B
refers to the system being trained on a dataset A and being tested on
a dataset B. We also report the results1 in matched conditions.
In general, we observe a drop in performance for all features
in mismatched conditions (Tables 1 and 2). The exception being,
when the dataset used for training is NIST. A detailed analysis of the
findings from the study are given below.
4.1. Effect of temporal context
In [6], we reported that when temporal context was used in matched
conditions, the performance of the individual and the feature combi-
nations improve. Tables 1 and 2 demonstrate that this is true for fea-
ture and classifier combinations in mismatched conditions as well.
1The performance figures reported here differ from [6] due to a corrected
implementation of kurtosis.
Also, tables 1, 2 show that a context of 500 ms provides a reason-
able tradeoff between accuracy and latency for feature and classi-
fier combinations. Among the individual features (Table 3), when a
temporal context of at least 500 ms is provided, kurtosis is the best
single feature in mismatched conditions as it was in matched condi-
tions. Similarly, energy is the second best feature. As in matched
condition studies, zero crossing rate fares worst on mismatched con-
ditions as well. Furthermore, we note that when temporal context is
modeled, all four features gain in performance. It can also be seen
from Table 1 that modeling temporal context also improves the per-
formance of AH features.
4.2. Feature and classifier combinations
Although not reported here, pairwise and three-way combinations
of features generally led to an improvement in performance in mis-
matched conditions as well. Among the three-way feature combi-
nations, F (EZK) was again consistently the best on mismatched
conditions. As was observed in matched conditions, it can also
be seen that there is no consistent improvement from F (EZK) to
F (SEZK). From Table 1, it can be observed that while testing on
Table 3. Performance of individual features (in percentage of area under ROC) with a context of 500 ms, in matched and mismatched
conditions. N, A, and I refer to NIST, AMI, and ICSI datasets. A→ B refers to the system being trained on a dataset A and being tested on a
dataset B.
Features N A I N→A N→I A→N A→I I→N I→A
Matched conditions Mismatched conditions
S 80.5 84.7 75.1 82.7 70.8 80.0 71.9 75.6 77.5
E 80.1 87.2 77.0 81.9 75.9 82.3 75.6 80.6 83.8
Z 78.8 81.5 69.5 72.8 55.4 79.3 64.4 64.0 65.0
K 82.8 87.9 77.7 83.3 76.2 81.4 75.6 82.2 85.0
AMI (by training on either NIST or ICSI) yielded better performance
for F (SEZK), testing on ICSI or NIST yielded better performance
for F (EZK).
Table 2 reports the comparison between the two classifier com-
bination methods, Cmean(SEZK) and Cent(SEZK). It can be
observed that the two methods are very similar on matched condi-
tions. On mismatched conditions, the two methods show an impor-
tant difference: training on NIST, Cmean(SEZK) is better while
testing on NIST, Cent(SEZK) is better. This may be due to the
fact that when the classifiers are trained on more data2 and there-
fore yield more robust estimates of posteriors, the confidence-based
“inverse-entropy” method performs better. Otherwise, averaging is
better when the estimates are not so robust (when the training data is
less).
Between feature and classifier combinations, it can be seen that
on matched conditions, training on NIST shows classifier combina-
tion techniques to be better for SEZK, while feature combination
technique is better for AMI and ICSI datasets. This could also be
due to differences in amount of training data. With a larger amount
of training data, MLP is able to exploit the cross-correlation between
the features in feature combinations. On the other hand, with lesser
data, classifier combination yields better results.
On mismatched conditions, when NIST is used as training data,
classifier combination is better while when AMI or ICSI datasets are
used for training, feature combinations are better.
4.3. Comparison between F (SEZK) and AH
Table 1 shows that the comparison with the AH features shows
mixed results. For example, training on NIST dataset, F (SEZK)
is better while testing on NIST, AH is better. Also, training on AMI,
F (EZK) is better than AH, while testing on ICSI, AH is better than
F (EZK).
However, the AH features are not significantly different from
the F (SEZK) features, except for the way the spectral entropy is
estimated. In AH , it is estimated explicitly in the spectral domain
while in the proposed features, it is done through the residual ob-
tained from linear prediction. This could be the reason for the mixed
results.
4.4. Comparison with MF − PLP
We now compare how the privacy-sensitive features perform against
the reference spectral-based features (MF-PLP). In matched condi-
tions, F (SEZK) and AH perform similar to the reference features
on NIST and AMI datasets. In mismatched conditions, we observe
that MF-PLP features are better than both the privacy sensitive fea-
tures in certain cases.
2NIST dataset has less training data than AMI and ICSI
5. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we evaluated the robustness of the four privacy-
sensitive features, namely, energy, zero crossing rate, spectral flat-
ness measure, and kurtosis in mismatched conditions. We believe
that to be a necessary step, as in real-life, mismatched conditions
might be pervasive. For SND, we showed that explicitly modeling
the temporal context is useful in mismatched conditions as well.
Feature and classifier combinations for the proposed features on
matched and mismatched conditions were explored. Furthermore,
we showed that combining features or combining classifiers built
on the individual features yield improvements. In addition, we
showed that in certain cases, the combinations of the four features
with context modeling can yield performance comparable to the
state-of-the-art spectral based features in mismatched conditions.
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